How does the additional uncertainty associated with noisy economic data a ect business cycle uctuations? I use a simple variant of the neoclassical growth model to show that the answer depends crucially on the assumed expectation-formation capabilities of agents. Under e cient signal extracting, noisy economic indicators dampen cyclical volatility. The opposite occurs when agents follow a simple bounded rational strategy. JEL Classi cation: E32, D84, C61
Introduction
This paper takes a well known microeconomic fact and analyzes its commonly overlooked macroeconomic consequences. The fact is that agents often have to make decisions on the basis of preliminary and noisy information about the world, such as the news provided by early estimates of key economic indicators. 1 How does this additional layer of uncertainty at the micro level a ect macroeconomic uctuations? 2 I will focus here on the relationship between noisy data and cyclical volatility. Does the added uncertainty associated with noisy data make the economy more or less volatile? Would the introduction of better economic indicators lead to dampened or wider business cycle oscillations?
The results are presented in a series of richer analyses. Section 2 introduces the basic modeling framework: a simple variant of the neoclassical growth model augmented with stochastic productivity shocks. Section 3 completes the discussion of the model by solving it under the assumption that the productivity shocks are perfectly observable. This information structure is changed in section 4. There I assume that the state of productivity becomes observable only after production takes place. Until then, all that the agents see is a noisy indicator of the true state of productivity. I then solve the model under two polar characterizations of the agents' information processing capabilities. If we assume that agents use optimal signal extraction techniques, it can be shown that the noisy component of the indicator works to dampen cyclical volatility. In particular, the variance of output in the noisy-indicator economy is less than that associated with the economy de-1 A number of statistical studies have documented the large degree of measurement error and low signal-to-noise ratios of many economic indicators. See, e.g., Diebold and Rudebusch 1991 , Mankiw, Runkle and Shapiro 1984 , and Kennedy 1993 Other papers that have examined the macroeconomic implications of noisy indicators include Oh and Waldman 1990 , 1995 and Kasa 1996 scribed in section 3. In contrast, if we postulate that individual behavior is characterized by a simple bounded rationality strategy, where the agents do not engage in signal extraction, then the noisy-indicator economy displays higher volatility than its perfect-indicator counterpart. Section 5 provides additional discussion of the main results and concludes.
The Model
The theoretical framework is a variant of the well-known dynamic general equilibrium model of King, Plosser and Rebelo 1988 . As shown below, I make the simplifying assumption that the labor supply schedule is inelastic. where t is the discounted Lagrange multiplier and z t expA t . Given the stochastic sequence fA t g 1 t=0 , a s w ell as a particular expectationformation mechanism, the values of fc t ; i t ; t g 1 t=0 that maximize the expected value of 5 characterize the business cycles of this arti cial economy.
Setting expectational issues aside for the moment, the derivation of the system of Euler equations that corresponds to the maximization of 5 is straightforward. This system can bewritten as follows: To complete the solution to the model we need two additional assumptions. The rst concerns the law of motion of A t , which I assume to follow a rst-order autoregression A t = A t,1 + a t 10 where j j 1, and a t is white noise with variance aa .
The second remaining assumption deals with the information structure. In particular, I start by assuming that i agents know the stochastic process governing A t and ii A t is perfectly observable at the beginning of each period. These assumptions allow us to write the capital accumulation decision rule as:k 4 Decision Rules with Noisy Data I will now modify the information structure by assuming that agents do not observe the state of productivity before production takes place. Instead, at the beginning of each period, agents observe a preliminary announcement of the current state of technology. This preliminary announcement t is subject to measurement error e t : where e t is white noise with variance ee and is uncorrelated with a t .
As in Kydland and Prescott 1982 , agents follow a two-stage decision process. In the rst stage, they make their factor allocation decision, which is based on the preliminary announcement. Once production takes place, the second stage begins. The representative agent can use its knowledge of output and inputs to deduce the value of the productivity shock A t . Given this larger information set, agents update their forecasts of future economic conditions.
We are now ready to address the main question posed in this paper. What happens to cyclical volatility when there is noise in the indicator? In particular, how is the variance of output a ected by the noisy indicator? As I show below, the answer depends on how agents deal with the measurement error problem.
E cient Signal Extraction
The agents' problem is to come up with a forecast of A t given its noisy indicator. We start by assuming that they are endowed with a statistically e cient signal-extraction technique. In particular, equations 10 and 14 form a state-space system that can bepassed through the Kalman lter to generate optimal forecasts of A t conditioned on the preliminary announcement t . Letting E A t jA t,1 ; t denote this prediction, we can write E A t jA t,1 ; t = 1 , A t,1 + t 15 where aa = aa + ee . Equation 15 is straightforward to derive and has a very intuitive interpretation. Accordingly, the higher the signal-tonoise ratio aa = ee associated with t , the more weight will be attached to the preliminary announcement when forming expectations of A t .
Again, substituting the prediction formula for A t into the equilibrium law of motion fork t |equation 9|yields the capital accumulation decision rule: where yy denotes the variance of output in the noisy-indicator" economy under e cient signal processing.
The above equation has two noteworthy features. First, unlike the perfectindicator economy, there are 2 sources of output uctuations in the noisyindicator economy: the productivity shock|which was the sole source of volatility in the PI economy|and the indicator noise. Second, it is easy to show that, for ee = 0, the equation reduces to 13. What happens to output volatility in the more general case where ee 6 = 0 ? After some tedious algebra it can beshown that which, given that 0 1, implies that output is more volatile in the perfect indicator economy. Thus, even though the noisy component of the productivity indicator is an additional source of volatility, output uctuations are dampened by the presence of the noisy indicator.
The intuition for this result is simple. The agents know that the indicator is contaminated by noise and use an e cient technique to estimate its signal component. E ectively, they end up basing their decisions on an e cient estimate of the state of productivity, an estimate that is necessarily smoother than the state of productivity itself. Hence, despite the additional uncertainty represented by the noise component, output is less variable than what otherwise would be the case.
No Signal Extraction
As shown above, t is an unbiased indicator of the true state of productivity. What if the agents take the indicator at face value? is the variance of output in the noisy-indicator economy with no signal extraction. Equation 18 makes it clear that, for ee 0, the noisy indicator increases output volatility when agents fail to signal-extract, a result that is in stark contrast to the e cient signal extraction case. Again, the intuition is very clear: by taking the indicator at face value, the agents end up reacting not just to fundamental shocks to productivity, but also to the pure noise associated with measurement error in the preliminary announcement.
Concluding Remarks
The aggregate e ect of noisy economic indicators depends on the degree of sophistication with which agents process incoming economic data. Noisy data dampen cyclical volatility when agents use e cient signal extraction techniques, but exacerbate it when they take the data at face value. Which of the two scenarios is more likely in the real world? This is an empirical question that goes beyond the scope of this paper and touches at the heart of the question of just how rational" the expectations of economic agents are. Nevertheless, the results presented in paper do suggest a novel way of addressing this question. Namely, if we can identify two time periods|one with superior data, the other more prone to measurement error problems| the one with better economic indicators should have l o wer cyclical volatility, other things being equal, if the agents violate the rational expectations assumption.
The results also pave the way to other avenues for future research. I am currently investigating two issues. The rst relates to the quantitative importance of measurement error in business cycle uctuations. Are the results presented here economically important? I plan to analyze this question in the context of a richer model that allows for quantitative experiments. A second direction for future research pertains to the relationship betweennancial market volatility and preliminary announcements of macroeconomic and business data. Is this relationship consistent with the e cient market hypothesis? The ndings reported in this paper suggest that, controlling for other sources of uctuations, the e cient market hypothesis implies that periods of decreased uncertainty about the state of the economy should coincide with bouts of higher nancial market volatility. and , The U.S. Government's Index of Leading Economic Indicators as a Source of Expectational Shocks," 1995. Working Paper, Cornell University.
